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Abstract
A property of a system is called actual, if the observation of the test that
pertains to that property, yields an affirmation with certainty. We formal-
ize the act of observation by assuming that the outcome correlates with
the state of the observed system and is codified as an actual property
of the state of the observer at the end of the measurement interaction.
For an actual property, the observed outcome has to affirm that property
with certainty, hence in this case the correlation needs to be perfect. A
property is called classical if either the property or its negation is actual.
It is shown by a diagonal argument that there exist classical properties of
an observer that he cannot observe perfectly. Because states are identified
with the collection of properties that are actual for that state, it follows
that no observer can perfectly observe his own state. Implications for the
quantum measurement problem are briefly discussed.
pacs: 02.10.-v, 03.65.Ta keywords: undecidability, observation, self-
reference, quantum measurement problem
1 Introduction: states and properties
In the realm of quantum physical experiments, data often consists of noth-
ing more than clicks of detectors or spots on a photographic plate collected
at certain instances and positions. With a sufficient amount of such clicks,
obtained under specific circumstances, we can establish the properties and
hence determine the state of the system, at least to a precision that de-
pends in principle only on the amount of clicks we care to gather. How
does this work? The state, a representation of the ‘mode of being’ of
a system, determines the properties of the system. Loosely speaking, a
property of a system is something that can be attributed to that system
with a certain persistency. Birkhoff and von Neumann made the first
decisive step towards the characterization of a system through its proper-
ties. They called quantities which yield only one of two possible results,
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and which are testable in a reproducible sense ‘experimental propositions’.
Such experiments also form the operational basis of the Geneva-Brussels
approach, in which a property is introduced as an equivalence class of tests
(also called questions or experimental projects), and a state is regarded as
a set of actual properties. We will introduce the notion of property and
state through the state-property spaces as can be found in [1], but this
paper is fully self-contained and we will introduce the required definitions
along the way. Consider a physical entity S with its (non-empty) set of
states ΣS and (non-empty) set of properties LS . States will be denoted by
small roman script p, q, r,. . . and properties by small bold script a,b,c,...
We assume the state fully characterizes the properties of the entity, some
of which may be actual, and some not. What do we mean when we say an
entity has an actual property a? We assume that for every property a in
LS there exists a test, let us call it χˆa, that tests property a. The result
of the test is a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’1. If the test yields ‘yes’ with certainty,
we say property a is actual.
Definition 1 (actual property). An entity S in the state p, is said to
have an actual property a iff the test χˆa that tests property a yields ‘yes’
with certainty.
Note that this is in accordance with what we intuitively mean when
we say that “a system has a property”. Two tests χˆa and χˆb are called
equivalent when it is the case that for any state p where χˆa gives with
certainty ‘yes’, we also have that χˆb gives with certainty ‘yes’, and vice
versa. We will say equivalent tests, test the same property. Vice versa,
a property is identified with an equivalence class of tests. A property is
actual when any test in the equivalence class yields ‘yes’ with certainty,
because all tests will then yield ‘yes’ with certainty.
A given property a ∈ LS may be actual for some of the states p ∈ ΣS
of the entity, but not necessarily for all. To make this notion precise,
employing the usual notation P(ΣS) for the set of all subsets of ΣS , we
postulate the map κS : LS → P(ΣS), called the Cartan map, such that
κS(a) is the set of states in ΣS for which the property a is actual. The
triple (ΣS ,LS, κS) will be called a state property space [1] and fully char-
acterizes what can be known about the entity with certainty.
Definition 2 (state property space). The triple (ΣS ,LS , κS), called
a state property space, consists of two sets ΣS and LS (where ΣS is the
set of states of a physical entity S, and LS its set of properties), and a
function κS : LS → P(ΣS), such that a ∈ LS is actual for the entity in a
state p iff p ∈ κS(a).
When a property is not actual for the entity S in a given state, we will
say this property is potential.
Definition 3 (potential property). If, for a given entity S in the state
p, the property b ∈ LS is not actual (p /∈ κS(b)), then the property b is
1If one prefers a mathematical definition, one can regard the test as a mapping ΣS×LS →
{yes, no}. This is not customary in the Geneva-Brussels approach, where the test is mainly
regarded as an operational primitive to come to the formal description provided by the Cartan
map and its inverse.
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called potential for the entity S in the state p. We write p ∈ κCS (b) ≡
ΣS − κS(b).
Operationally speaking, there is an obvious inverse of a test that we
introduce in the following definition.
Definition 4 (inverse test). If χˆa tests property a, then switching the
roles of ‘yes’ and ‘no’ defines an new test denoted χˆa⊥ , which yields ‘yes’
when χˆa yields ‘no’, and vice versa. We will call χˆa⊥ the inverse test of
χˆa.
The test χˆa⊥ is operationally well-defined by simply switching the
outcomes of the test χˆa. The notation χˆa⊥ suggests that it tests “the
property a⊥” , but in general we cannot associate a⊥ with a well-defined
property as an equivalence class of tests. The problem is that one can
easily give examples of tests that are equivalent to χˆa, but for which the
inverse test is not equivalent to χˆa⊥ .
2 There is however an important
class of properties, the classical properties, for which this problem does
not arise.
Definition 5 (classical property). A test that has a predetermined
answer, is a classical test. A property that is defined as an equivalence
class of classical tests, will be called a classical property.
Definition 6 (inverse classical property). Given an entity S with a
classical property a ∈ LS. Then the inverse test χˆa⊥ , defines a property
denoted a⊥, called the inverse of a.
To show that this definition makes sense, we show that for a classical
property, the inverse property a⊥ is well-defined by the equivalence class of
tests that contains χˆa⊥ . That is, we have to show that for two arbitrary
tests χˆa and χˆ
′
a in the equivalence class of a classical property a, the
corresponding inverse tests, χˆa⊥ and χˆ
′
a⊥
, are also equivalent. First note
that, because χˆa and χˆ
′
a are classical tests, so are their inverses, hence
all tests give either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with certainty. Suppose that, for a given
entity in a given state, χˆa⊥ gives ‘yes’, then χˆa, gives ‘no’. Since χˆa and
χˆ′a are equivalent by assumption, χˆ
′
a would give ‘no’ too. But then χˆ
′
a⊥
gives ‘yes’, so that χˆa⊥ and χˆ
′
a⊥
are equivalent, and a⊥ is well-defined.
Obviously, if the property a is classical, then so is a⊥. Equally ob-
vious, we have for a classical property that the operation of inversion is
idempotent: a⊥⊥ = a. In the light of the preceding remarks, it is natural
to postulate that, for an entity S for which a ∈ LS is a classical property,
we always have that a⊥ ∈ LS too. For an entity S that has a classical
property a , we have that ∀s ∈ ΣS either a, or a
⊥ is actual. Hence a
classical property a partitions the state space ΣS in just two sets
κS(a) ∪ κS(a
⊥) = ΣS (1)
κS(a) ∩ κS(a
⊥) = ∅
2As an example, take a spin 1 system, for which the spin S can take either one of three
values {−1, 0,+1}. Call a the property of yielding S = +1 with certainty when tested, and
likewise b and c the properties of having S = 0 and S = −1 respectively. Because the actuality
of the properties a and b mutually exclude each other, we could perhaps propose b = a⊥.
By the same token, c is a candidate for b⊥. However, the tests pertaining to a and c are
manifestly not equivalent.
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We note that in the development of the Geneva-Brussels approach, further
axioms are imposed on LS so that the properties of a general physical
system form a complete, atomistic and orthomodular lattice [1]. The
problem of the ‘inverse property’ is then treated by the introduction of
ortho-axioms on LS [2], and the role of the inversion is played by the
orthocomplementation. For a Boolean sub-lattice of LS , or for an entity
that is classical, (i.e. an entity for which LS is a Boolean lattice), the
orthocomplementation reduces to the Boolean NOT. In either case, it is
assumed that, if a ∈ LS, then a
⊥ ∈ LS too. For our purposes here, we
will only require the existence of the inverse of every classical property in
LS , as established operationally through the definition of the inverse test.
2 The formalization of observation
Up to now, we are in close accordance with the Geneva-Brussels approach
[1], which is recognized for being both realistic (entities are in a state
that completely describes the status of all properties that pertain to the
entity) and operational (properties are defined as equivalence classes of
experiments). However, the question of how to test a property, is not
formalized. According to the Geneva-Brussels prescription, to see whether
property a is actual, an observer needs to perform the test χˆa. But if
states are indeed realistic descriptions of systems, then in a more detailed
account, the observer has to be regarded as a system having properties
in its own right. We can define the state property space for the observer
just as we did for the entity: (ΣM ,LM , κM ). The observing system
performs the test and formulates the outcome. This outcome defines in
a natural way an actual property of the state of the observer after the
observation. Indeed, if an outcome occurs, the state of the observer has
either the property thatM formulates the outcome ‘yes’, or M formulates
the outcome ‘no’. We define the property i as follows:
i : the outcome indicated by the observing system is ‘yes’
If the experiment is not repeated and we re-read the outcome of the ob-
servation, then we need to get the same result. So the outcome of a test
defines a classical property of the observer. The particular outcome of an
observation then depends on whether the state of the observer after the
measurement interaction belongs to
κM (i) or to κM (i
⊥) (2)
If we call Σ′M the space of observer states after interaction, then the indica-
tor property partitions Σ′M : κM (i) ∩ κM (i
⊥) = ∅ and κM (i)∪ κM (i
⊥) =
Σ′M . When the observing system is for example a photomultiplier or a
Geiger-Muller counter, we even have Σ′M = ΣM as long as the experiment
is running. In an arbitrary small time interval of the running experiment,
the detector has fired, or it hasn’t. Hence its state indicates ‘yes’ or ‘no’
for that interval. This shows that the set of states the active detector can
attain, equals the set of states that indicate a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’.
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2.1 The observer interacts to test a property
So far we have described a system can have properties, which partitions its
set of states, and the observer is the one who indicates the outcome, which
in turn partitions his set of states (2). These are two very basic desiderata
of the process of observing a property. But we have yet to include the
most important ingredient: the result of the observation should pertain
to the entity under study. If the observer is faithfully observing the result
of the test corresponding to an actual property a of the entity S, then a
fortiori the observation has to yield ‘yes’ when the property holds. Hence
the state of the observer m′ after the act of observation has to express
‘yes’:
s ∈ κS (a)⇒ m
′ ∈ κM (i) (3)
If the observer did not interact with the entity, this implication cannot
reasonably be expected to hold. Hereafter, we denote the state of the
system S under investigation by s and the state of the observer M that is
measuring S, by m. Assume then an observer in a state m ∈ ΣM interacts
with an entity in the state s ∈ ΣS. There are many ways conceivable to
form a new state from two interacting states, but we need not go into
details. We only assume that the compound state is a function τ of the
two constituting states:
τ : ΣS × ΣM → ΣS+M (4)
From this compound system, there has to be a flow of information to
the state of the observer. After the interaction the state of the observer
(regarded again as a single system) should convey the outcome of the
observation. That is, there has to exist a restriction ρ of the state of the
total system to the set of states of the observer
ρ : ΣS+M → ΣM (5)
The nature of the restriction ρ is also quite irrelevant for our purposes. It
can be a partial trace, or perhaps a projection onto some subspace. It is
this new state m′ of the observer that indicates ‘yes’ or ‘no’, depending
on whether it belongs to κM (i) or to κM (i
⊥). We formulate this as φ :
ΣM → {yes, no}
φ(m′) = yes ⇐⇒ m′ ∈ κM (i) (6)
φ(m′) = no ⇐⇒ m′ ∈ κM
(
i⊥
)
We summarize our model of observation by composing (6), (5) and (4)
into a single mapping o = φ ◦ ρ ◦ τ :
o : ΣS × ΣM → {yes, no} (7)
We assume that o(s,m) is surjective (both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ can be obtained
by an interaction between S and M), and that o(s,m) is defined for all3
3We feel justified in this assumption, not because all interactions necessarily lead to well-
defined outcomes, but because outcomes that are not defined, cannot express a scientific
value.
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of ΣS × ΣM . Besides these two relatively mild regularity conditions, it is
crucial that o is single-valued for the couples (s,m) such that m is a state
that is to measure a property that is actual for the system in the state s.
Otherwise the implication (3) cannot hold, because actuality means the
corresponding test yields ‘yes’ with certainty. For a potential property
the outcome can be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, so that in this case o(s,m) could
be two-valued in principle. Hence we propose the following definition of
‘perfectness’:
Definition 7 (Perfect Observation). Let Λ ∈ P(LS) be a non-empty
collection of properties of an entity S. A state m of an observer M, ob-
serving an entity S, will be called Λ-perfect iff there exists a mapping (7)
o : ΣS × ΣM → {yes, no}, such that for each property a ∈ Λ and for
every state s ∈ ΣS , we have that for that particular state m ∈ ΣM :
s ∈ κS(a) =⇒ o(s,m) = yes (8)
s ∈ κCS (a) =⇒ o(s,m) could be yes and could be no (9)
We remark that the particular state m of a Λ-perfect observer M for
which the correlation (3) holds, will also be called Λ-perfect. This means
that an observer M can be Λ-perfect only if there exists at least a single
state m ∈ ΣM that is Λ-perfect, and that he is Λ-perfect only if he is
in the state that realizes (3). Moreover, if the state m is Λ-perfect with
a ∈ Λ and we want to concentrate on this specific property a, then, with
slight abuse of notation, we will write “m is a-perfect”. We argue that
this is the most simple case that deserves to be called perfect observation:
when the observer is in a state that is able to properly observe at least a
single property of an entity, regardless the particular state the entity is in.
Suppose we made the notion of Λ-perfectness dependent on the state of
S, then the fixed observer, indicating a permanent ‘yes’ (or a ‘no’), would
be “perfect” in perhaps as much as half the cases, without even having
to bother about making an observation. We argue that the purpose of
observation is to infer the state from the outcomes. The observer cannot,
in general, be expected to know in advance which state he is measuring,
and “perfectness” entails that he produces the right correlation (3) for
any state of the entity in its proper state space ΣS . Of course, different
states m and m′ can be perfect with respect to different properties and in
this way an observer with a rich state space can be perfect with respect
to a large set of properties, provided he knows how to attain those states.
Our definition of perfect observation leaves some unnecessary ambigu-
ity with respect to classical properties. Recall that a property is classical,
if for any state s of S, we have that either a or a⊥ is actual. Suppose
that a⊥ is actual, then s ∈ κCS (a) and the definition of perfectness we
have now, only tells us the outcome could be yes or could be no. But the
Geneva-Brussels approach tells us more. First, the result of the test that
corresponds to a classical property is predetermined, so o(s,m) needs to
be single-valued: o(s,m) is always no or is always yes. Second, the in-
verse test χˆa⊥ was defined by switching the outcomes of the test χˆa, so
we know the result has to be ‘no’ with certainty. Because we formalized
the notion of the observation by means of interaction with an observer,
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we need to formalize this ‘switching’ procedure to test the inverse of a
classical property on the level of the state of the observer.
Definition 8 (Inverse complete). A mapping α : ΣM → ΣM is called
an inversion (with respect to o) iff
o(s,m) 6= o(s, α(m))
o(s,m) = o(s, α(α(m)))
A Λ-perfect observer M is called inverse complete iff, for every classical
property a ∈ Λ of S in the state s ∈ ΣS , and for every m ∈ ΣM that tests
a perfectly, there exists at least one state α(m) ∈ ΣM .
Logically speaking, and this is one of the cornerstones in our argument,
it makes no sense to assert that we have observed a classical property to
be actual, when we know that we would have received the same outcome
when the property is not actual. So we argue that the actuality of inverse
properties, requires inverse outcomes: for an observer to be perfect with
respect to a classical property a, there has to exist a state of the observer
that is a⊥-perfect.
Definition 9 (Classical perfect). A state m ∈ ΣM of M is a-classical
perfect iff m is a-perfect and α(m) exists in ΣM which is a
⊥-perfect. An
observer M will be called a-classical perfect iff he is in a state m ∈ ΣM
that is a-classical perfect.
But if an observer is a-perfect and he is able to switch the roles of ‘yes’
and ‘no’, then he should also be a⊥-perfect. We now show this is indeed
the case.
Theorem 1. Given an entity S with a classical property a ∈ LS, and an
inverse complete observer M with an inversion α. Then
m is a-perfect ⇐⇒ α(m) is a⊥-perfect
Proof: We first prove the left to right implication. Because a ∈ LS
is a classical property, we have that {κS(a), κS(a
⊥)} is a partition of ΣS .
Suppose then first that s ∈ κS(a). If m is a-perfect, then o(s,m) = yes.
Hence o(s, α(m)) = no, indicating α(m) is indeed a⊥-perfect when s ∈
κS(a). Suppose on the other hand that s ∈ κS(a
⊥). By the assumption
that m is a-perfect, with a classical, we have that o(s,m) is single-valued
and o(s,m) is always yes or is always no. By the definition of the inversion
α, we then get o(s, α(m)) is always no or is always yes. Suppose then
that o(s, α(m)) is always no. Then o(s, α(α(m))) is always yes, and by
the idempotency of α, o(s,m) is also always yes. But if o(s,m) is always
yes, then (because m is a-perfect by assumption) this implies s ∈ κS(a),
which contradicts the assumption that s ∈ κS(a
⊥). Therefore o(s, α(m))
cannot be always no, and hence has to be always yes. We then have
s ∈ κS(a
⊥) =⇒ o(s, α(m)) = yes, making α(m) indeed a⊥-perfect when
s ∈ κS(a
⊥). For the reverse implication, call b = a⊥ , and α(m) = m∗.
Because a is classical, so is b. Then, by the first part of the proof, we
havem∗ is b-perfect implies α(m∗) is b⊥-perfect. By idempotency of α we
have o(s, α(m∗)) = o(s, α(α(m))) = o(s,m) and for a classical property
b⊥ = a⊥⊥ = a. So m is a-perfect.
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As the inversion α is defined on the level of the outcomes generated
by o(s,m), the image α(m) need not necessarily be unique. Still the last
theorem can be reversed, as is shown in the following:
Theorem 2. Given an entity S with a classical property a ∈ LS and an
observer M . If m ∈ ΣM is a-perfect and m
∗ ∈ ΣM is a
⊥-perfect, then
m∗ is an inversion of m.
Proof: Both m and m∗ are in ΣM , hence m
∗ = β(m) with β : ΣM →
ΣM . If m is a-perfect and s ∈ κS(a), then o(s,m) is always yes. Hence if
β(m) is perfectly observing a⊥ then o(s, β(m)) can never be yes because
a is classical. Hence we have o(s,m) 6= o(s, β(m)). If on the other hand m
is a-perfect but s ∈ κS(a
⊥), then o(s,m) = no. But by assumption β(m)
is a⊥-perfect and this is actual, hence o(s, β(m)) = yes. Because o(s,m)
is two-valued and defined for all of ΣS × ΣM , the condition o(s,m) 6=
o(s, β(m)) implies o(s,m) = o(s, β(β(m))). So β is indeed an inversion.
The correlation (3) thus becomes much stronger for a classical property
observed by a classically perfect observer. Indeed, if a is classical, we have
that either a or a⊥ is actual. So either o(s,m) or o(s, α(m)) has to be
single-valued for any given s. But because α(m) and m are each others
inversion, both o(s, α(m)) and o(s,m) have to be single-valued. So a-
classical perfect observation implies
s ∈ κS(a) ⇐⇒ o(s,m) = yes (10)
s ∈ κS(a
⊥) ⇐⇒ o(s,m) = no (11)
Similar equations apply for the state α(m) with yes and no switched.
Arguably, the ultimate purpose of observation is not only to measure
a single property, but to infer the state of an entity by performing tests
and formulating outcomes. Such an observer is able to observe the state
of the entity S and will be called “S-knowledgable ”. In the operational
approach to quantum logic [1], the so-called “state determination axiom”
dictates that a state is determined by the set of properties that are actual
in that state. If an observer is to be able to infer an arbitrary state of S,
then for each separate actual property a of the entity S that he is asked
to observe, he should be able to acquire a state m that is a-perfect. We
formulate this in our last definition.
Definition 10. An observer M will be said to be S-knowledgable iff for
an arbitrary state s ∈ ΣS of S and for every property a ∈ LS that is
actual for s, there exists a state m ∈ ΣM that is a-perfect.
Note that this definition is lenient in the sense that it does not require
there should exist a single state of the observer that is perfect for all
properties. However, this advantage automatically disappears when the
observer examines a property of himself, because perfect observation of a
property entails that he gives the right answer, regardless of the state of
the system under investigation!
2.2 Undecidability in observation
Can an observer M find out in which state a given system S is? By
definition he can iff for every property a that is actual in state s, there
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exists a state m ∈ ΣM that is a-perfect. Obviously, the set of actual
properties always includes the classical properties of S, because a property
is classical iff the property or its inverse is actual. Let us concentrate
on a specific classical property a of S. An observer could well be a-
classical perfect, or he might not be. In this way we define a new candidate
property for M : the property of “a-classical perfectness”, which we will
denote by pa. The test that corresponds to this property -letting the
observer interact with S and verify whether he perfectly observes the
property a- can be reliably performed only by an absolute observer. But
even if such an absolute observer exists, how is the observer to know for
himself whether he is perfect or not with respect to the observation of
a classical property? He cannot rely on the outcome given by another
‘god-like’ observer, because such an outcome is yet another example of
a classical property that he needs to observe, giving rise to the same
problem. If the observer is to find out, he will have to rely on his own
power of observation. For example, he should at least be sure about
what the outcome he observed, i.e. about the actuality of the classical
indicator property i . We now show there are fundamental restrictions to
the observation of the classical properties that pertain to himself.
Theorem 3. Let a be a classical property of M. If M is a-classical perfect,
then pa is classical too.
Proof: Because a is a property of M, and by the definition of per-
fect observation, M can only be a-classical perfect, if M can tell for any
state in ΣM whether a is actual or not. Hence all states of M have to
be a-classical perfect. Furthermore, because a is a classical property, a-
classical perfect observation entails the outcome has to be predetermined.
A predetermined outcome as a result of an observation of a classical prop-
erty, is either always right or always wrong, so that either pa or p
⊥
a is
actual for all m ∈ ΣM .
Theorem 4. Let a be a classical property of M. If M is a-classical perfect,
then M cannot observe pa-classical perfectly.
Proof: We proceed ad absurdum and assume that there exists a non-
empty set of states denoted Σpa
M
, such that m ∈ Σpa
M
observes pa-classical
perfect, i.e. m observes pa-perfectly, and α(m) observes p
⊥
a -perfectly. To
answer the question whether an arbitrary state m is pa-classical perfect,
M investigates the state m (either by introspection or by examining an
identical system in the same state). Because the property tested is pa
-which is classical by theorem 3- the definition of Σpa
M
is obtained by
rewriting (10) and (11) for M,m and pa :
Σpa
M
= {m ∈ ΣM : m ∈ κM (pa) ⇐⇒ o(m,m) = yes} (12)
Σpa
M
= {m ∈ ΣM : m ∈ κM (p
⊥
a ) ⇐⇒ o(m,m) = no} (13)
But classical perfectness with respect to pa, by inverse completeness, en-
tails that there exists at least one α(m) in ΣM with α(m) ∈ κM (p
⊥
a ).
Hence, if M is in the state α(m), application of (13) to α(m) gives:
α(m) ∈ κM (p
⊥
a ) ⇐⇒ o(α(m), α(m)) = no (14)
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But if equation (14) holds for α(m), then by (13), we have α(m) ∈ Σpa
M
.
This means pa is actual for α(m) and α(m) ∈ κM (pa). By (12), the
outcome should have been yes.
The construction of the proof relies on the necessary existence of α(m)
and is therefore recognized as a diagonal argument. For such an α(m) we
have to assume the outcome is ‘no’, expressing he is not pa-perfect. But
then this was a perfect observation and it should have been ‘yes’. The
structure that we find when an observer attempts to answer the question
of his own non-perfectness, is similar to the well-known Liar paradox, or
the Go¨del sentence “x : x is not provable”, whose very proof would seem
to imply the truth of the proposition, which states that it is not provable,
and so on... Regarded as a logical proposition, the terminology to indicate
this logically circular decision problem was called ‘undecidable’ by Go¨del
[6], hence the title of this paper. As a consequence of theorem 4, we now
prove that no observer can observe his own state perfectly.
Theorem 5. No observer M can be M-knowledgable.
Proof: An observer is M -knowledgable if he can perfectly observe all
actual properties of the state m he is in. Suppose a is a classical property
of M. There is at least one such a, because we postulated the outcome
indicator is a classical property. If M is not a-classical perfect, then he
cannot know his own state. Hence we assume M is a-classical perfect. By
theorem 3, pa is classical too, and he needs to be able to observe that
property classically perfect. We have shown that he cannot, indicating he
cannot observe all his actual properties. 
3 Concluding remarks
The real problem is, of course, that all observation is self-observation. The
detector doesn’t measure an exterior system directly, but rather through
an act of observation in the changes in the state of its own system. Of
course, the argument doesn’t deny that real observers can make Λ-perfect
observations with a high probability of success for a variety of properties.
The result says only that M cannot observe whether his observation was
Λ-perfect, or not. Also, nothing in our argument denies the possibility
of a second observer observing this first observer to be perfect (or not!)
in his observation. This would preempt the self-referential loop in the
proof. But this second observer faces the same problem, leading to an
infinite regression that cannot solve the original problem. This reminds
one of the way a stronger formal system can be used to decide whether
a given formal system is complete and consistent, but even this stronger
formal system cannot decide its own completeness and consistency. One
could say that the property of perfectness is potential only. This stance
is viable but begs the question how we should observe if we cannot do
it perfectly. Another possible generalization is to allow for a countable
set of outcomes for a test. It is, however, a quite characteristic feature
of undecidability arguments, that the essential result does not depend on
the cardinality of the outcome set, as long as it is countable. That no
observer can observe its own state perfectly, seems in close accordance
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with Breuer’s results [3], in which Breuer has shown by a very elegant
argument that there exist different states of an observer that he himself
cannot distinguish. To the best of our knowledge, the first presentation
showing the relevance of these issues in relation to the quantum measure-
ment problem, is the trail-blazing 1977 paper by Dalla Chiara [5]. This
is not the place to attempt an overview of the extensive literature on the
subject, and we refer to [4] and [7] and the references therein. These re-
sults explain why the quantummeasurement problem has not been solved.
If the theory describes every fundamental interaction, then it also has to
describe the process of observation. This allows for self-reference because
the theory talks about the way the results are tested, which are produced
by that same theory. Self-reference in turn, allows for the undecidabil-
ity. An undecidable proposition cannot be made decidable by additional
knowledge because it is not an epistemological issue. Thus an ontological
uncertainty about at least some of the measurement outcomes becomes
unavoidable. In agreement with [3], we argue this is not necessarily due to
the non-classicality of the properties or theory, but because we regard the
theory as fundamental, i.e. describing all processes. Perhaps one should
not describe the process of observation, or describe it in a fashion entirely
different than other processes. This pragmatic stance is taken in present
day quantum physics, and as a result, we have two different, incompatible
evolution laws and no clear rule to tell us what precisely constitutes an
observation and what is a normal interaction, and why they should be
treated differently. It seems we are left with two logical alternatives4 for
any theory that includes a description of the observation of the quanti-
ties it predicts: either we have a dichotomic split between the process
of observation and other interactions, or we include both under a single
heading and face the undecidability. In an upcoming article we will argue
the second possibility can serve as an alternative formulation of the basic
structure of quantum probability.
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